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California FEPC
By MicHAEL C. TOBBINE*
FAIR EMPLOYMENT as a political concept and the dynamics of the
civil rights movement in general provide the social and political
environment by which the California Fair Employment Practices Act'
was shaped and within which the Fair Employment Practices Commis-
sion2 functions. It is the purpose here to set forth in brief compass
the history and accomplishments of the FEPC and to describe the
inherent limitations of the FEPC in California.
History
The first proposed fair employment measures in California were
introduced unsuccessfully in 19433 and again in 1945." The next year
California's initiative procedure was tried when Fair Employment
Practices became Proposition 11 on the November general election
ballot.5 Opposition from the major newspapers, large segments of
organized labor, and strong support from communists6 resulted in a
stunning defeat for Fair Employment Practices. Fair Employment
Practices bills were introduced in 1947, 1949, 1951, and 1953 and all
of them met defeat.8 The prospects for fair employment legislation
were brightened, however, in 1954 by the formation of the California
Committee for Fair Employment Practices, which managed to enlist
the aid of labor, civil rights, religious, and community groups.9
After Fair Employment Practices bills were defeated in 1955 and
*A.B., 1962, Stanford University; A.M., 1964, Stanford University. The author
acknowledges the valuable help of Craig B. Jorgensen of the HAsTn Ns LAW JoUu'AL.
1 Hereinafter called FEPA.
2 Hereinafter called FEPC.
3 Cal. Assembly Bills Nos. 41, 50, 1732, 1775, Regular Sess. (1943).
4 Cal. Assembly Bill No. 3, Regular Sess. (1945).
5 CAL. SECRETAnY OF STATE REPORTS, PROPoSED AMENDMENTS To THE CON-
sTrru-noN: FAIr EMPLOymrNT PRACTncEs AcT (1946).
6 Interview With Secretary of California Committee for Fair Employment Practices,
in San Francisco, Jan. 30, 1962.
7 CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE REPORTS, STAT mENT OF VOTE, GENEiAL ELECnON
(1946).
8 For the accounts of fair employment legislation at the 1947, 1949, 1951, 1953
legislative sessions, see Cal. Legislature, Final Calendar of Legislative Business, Regular
Sessions, Ass. Bill No. 2211 (1947), Ass. Bill No. 3027 (1949), Ass. Bills Nos. 2251,
3436 (1951), Ass. Bills Nos. 900, 917, 1526 (1953).
9 Interview, supra note 6.
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1957,10 and following a sweeping Democratic victory in the 1958
California general elections," the present FEPA12 was enacted in the
1959 session and was signed into law on April 16, 1959, by Governor
Brown.
Analysis of the Provisions of the Fair Employment
Practices Act
The FEPA of 1959 not only condemns discrimination but attempts
•forcibly to eliminate it. While the framers of the act hoped that educa-
tion and persuasion could remove prejudice, they feared that a law
which exhorted equality without compelling it would be in the long
run only a palliative. 3 Thus, while they thought that the FEPC
should study the problems of discrimination and foster good will and
cooperation in the community, and while they decided that conciliation
should be the first step when evidence Qf discrimination was found,
at the same time they prescribed criminal penalities for violations
of FEPC orders to cease discriminating.' 4
To carry out their purposes the framers made it an "unlawful
employment practice"
(a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed,
color, national origin, or ancestry of any person, to refuse to
hire or employ him or to bar or to discharge from employment
such person, or to discriminate against such person in compensa-
tion or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 5
(b) For a labor organization, because of the race, religious
creed, color, national origin, or ancestry of any person, to
exclude, expel or restrict from its membership such person, or
to provide only second-class or segregated membership or
to discriminate in any way against any of its members or against
any employer or against any person employed by an employer. 6(c) For any employer or employment agency to print or
circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any publication,
10 See Cal. Legislature, Final Calendar of Legislative Business, Regular Sessions,
Ass. Bills Nos. 971, 1868 (1955), Ass. Bills Nos. 7, 2000, 2001 (1957).
1 CAL. SECBETARY OF STATE REPORTs, STATEmENT OF Vom, GENERAL ELscnoN
(1958).
12 CAL. LABoR CODE §§ 1410-32.
13 Interview With the Chief of the California Division of Fair Employment Practices,
in San Francisco, March 30, 1962; Interview With Secretary of the California Committee
for Fair Employment Practices, in San Francisco, Jan. 30, 1962; Interview With Counsel
for the California FEPC, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
14 Ibid.
1 5 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(a).
16 CAL. LABOR CoDE § 1420(b).
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or to use any form of application for employment or to make
any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which
expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification
or discrimination as to race, religious creed, color, national
origin or ancestry or any intent to make any such limitation,
specification or discrimination."T
Section 1420 (d) made it unlawful for any employer, labor organiza-
tion, or employment agency to "discharge, expel, or otherwise discrim-
inate" against any person because he opposed practices forbidden in
the sections quoted above or because he filed a complaint with or
testified for the FEPC. Section 1420(e) made illegal the aiding or
abetting of any of the practices forbidden by section 1420(a)-(d).
To enforce these policies the act created within the State Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations a division of Fair Employment Practices
and within that division a Fair Employment Practices Commission.18
The commission was to consist of five members, appointed by the
Governor for four-year terms and receiving fifty dollars a day plus
expenses for each day spent on the job."9 The act provided for a Chief
of the Division of Fair Employment Practices to be appointed by the
Governor and for such other employees, including legal counsel, as
the commission should deem necessary.20
The commission was empowered to receive complaints from any
person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful employment
practice.2' Upon receiving such a complaint,
when it shall appear to it [the commission] that an unlawful
employment practice may have been committed, the chair-
man of the commission shall desigate one of the commissioners
to make, with the assistance of the commission's staff, prompt
investigation in connection therewith. If such commissioner
determines after such investigation that further action is war-
ranted, he shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the un-
lawful employment practice complained of by conference,
conciliation and persuasion. 2
Conciliation proceedings were to be secret.23 An FEPC commis-
sioner or staff member who disclosed what transpired at such proceed-
17 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(c).
28 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1414.
19 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1414, 1416.
2 0 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1414, 1419.
2 1 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1422.
22 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1421.
23 Ibid.
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ings was guilty of a misdemeanor. 4 Original complaints could be
initiated not only by aggrieved individuals but also by the State
Attorney General and by an employer whose employees refused to
cooperate with the provisions of the act.25
If conciliation and persuasion failed, the commission could file
a formal "accusation" requiring the employer, labor organization,
or employment agency charged with discrimination to answer the
charges at a public hearing. Hearings were to be conducted according
to State administrative procedure. 26 The commission was given power
to subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths, and
require the production of books or papers relating to the matter under
investigation.27 The case for the FEPC was to be presented by its
counsel or agent.28 The commissioner who made the initial investiga-
tion and attempts at conciliation and persuasion was required not
to participate.9
If the commission found as a result of the hearings that a respondent
had engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the commission,
after stating its findings, could issue and serve on the respondent a
binding cease and desist order.30 The order could not only proscribe
the continuance of discrimination but could prescribe affirmative
remedial action, such as hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of
employees, with or without back pay, or restoration to membership
in a labor organization.31
Final orders of the commission were in all instances subject to
judicial review. 2 A respondent who lost his case at a commission
hearing could automatically appeal to the superior court for review
of the commission's findings on both fact and law. Conversely, when
the commission believed one of its final orders was being violated, it
could seek a superior court injunction.33 Willful violation of a final
order of the commission or interference with the commission or its
members in the performance of their duties was made a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for six months, a 500 dollar fine, or both.3 4
24 Ibid.
25 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1422.
26 CAL. LABoR CODE § 1424.
27 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1419.
28 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1425.
29 Ibid.
80 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1426.
31 Ibid.
32 CAL. LABoR CODE § 1428.
83 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1429.
34 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1430.
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Statistical Summary of Disposition of Complaints by
the Fair Employment Practices Commission
The FEPC has proved to be an effective instrument for redress of
individual grievances and has increased understanding and coopera-
tion through a vigorous program of education and information. A
brief sketch of the FEPC's regulatory and educational activities will
illustrate its accomplishments.
From the time it began operations on September 18, 1959, through
the period ending December 31, 1962, the FEPC docketed 2086
cases.3 Of these cases, 2004, or 96 per cent, were complaints initiated
by aggrieved individuals themselves, 0 while only 82, or 4 percent
were initiated by the commission pursuant to its powers under
section 14 2 1 .37 As these figures indicate, the commission has been
extremely cautious in initiating complaints on its own volition. Only
in situations where discrimination is traditional, outrageous, and overt
will the commission so act. The commission fears it will arouse
hostility and resentment by initiating complaints itself. It wants to
modify its role as prosecutor and emphasize its role as judge.38
Of the 2086 complaints docketed during the period in question
1417, or 68 percent, named private employers as the respondent.39
This indicates not that private employers are the most frequent trans-
gressors of the FEPA but rather (1) that victims of discrimination
more readily attribute discriminatory activities to private employers
than to other agencies covered by the act, and (2) that such victims
view the act as an instrument to protect them against private employers
rather than against public employers, employment agencies, or labor
unions.40 Of the remainder of the complaints, 18 percent were brought
against employment agencies, and 5 percent against labor unions. 41
Of 2086 complaints, in 1846, or 88 percent, the alleged basis of
discrimination was that the aggrieved individual was a member of the
Negro race.4 In 4 percent of the complaints, Spanish ancestry was
the alleged basis of discrimination,43 and in another 4 percent a partic-
35 [1961-1962] FEPC REPORTS 17.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Interview With FEPC Education Officer, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
89 [1961-1962] FEPC REPORTS 23.
4 0 Interview, supra note 38.
41 [1961-1962] FEPC REPORTS 23.
42Id. at 21.
4s Ibid.
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ular religious faith was the basis of discrimination. 4 In 1 percent of
the complaints the alleged basis of discrimination was that the
aggrieved individual was himself opposed to discrimination.45
The commission's statistics describing the alleged discriminatory
act in the 2086 total complaints show again that private employers
are by far the largest group against whom complaints are filed.4 6 Only
6 percent of the complaints alleged that union membership had been
withheld or some other form of union discrimination had taken place. 7
Only 5 percent of the complaints claimed that an employment agency
had withheld referral.48 But 46 percent of the complaints alleged that
a private employer had refused to hire the aggrieved individual; 49
25 percent claimed a private employer had dismissed the complainant
from employment;50 11 percent charged an employer with providing
unequal working conditions; 51 and 10 percent alleged that an employer
was guilty of refusal to upgrade.
Of these 2086 complaints 1653 were closed and 438 remained
pending by the end of the period. 3 In 163, or 10 percent of the cases
closed, the complaints had been dismissed either because the commis-
sion lacked jurisdiction or because the complainant failed to proceed.5
Decisions as to whether or not the commission has jurisdiction may be
made by the commissioner who first receives the complaint and who
would normally then proceed to investigate and, if necessary, con-
ciliate; or, such decisions may be made by the commission sitting at
a public hearing after conciliation has failed and an accusation has
been filed. Also, such decisions may be taken by a court to which a
commission final order is appealed.55
However, in 1490, or 90 percent, of the 1653 cases closed, the
commission did have jurisdiction and the complainant did not fail to
proceed;" of these 1490 cases, 978, or 66 percent, were dismissed be-
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 22.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 26. The total percentage of "alleged discriminatory acts" is more than
100, since more than one discriminatory act may be alleged in a single complaint.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Interview With FEPC Education Officer, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
56 [1961-1962] FEPC ,EPoETs 26.
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cause of insufficient or no evidence of discrimination.57 Discrimination
was found to exist in 512, or 34 percent, of the cases.58 Of the 512 cases
in which discrimination was found to exist, all but 4 were closed by
what the commission calls "satisfactory adjustment." 9 The term
means simply that the commission and the respondent have negotiated
an agreement whereby the latter has promised to redress the aggrieved
individual and to correct its discriminatory practices.60 In 45 percent
of the cases resolved in this manner, the respondent offered to hire,
reinstate, or promote the aggrieved individual without delay. In 81
percent of these cases the respondent agreed either to strengthen a
fair employment policy already promulgated or to initiate one if none
existed.61
Other types of agreements varied widely; in 9 percent of the cases
the respondent offered to hire, reinstate, or promote an individual
other than the complainant; in 7 percent the respondent promised to
to hire or to promote the complainant not immediately but at the first
opportunity; in 13 percent the respondent promised only to consider
hiring or promotion at the first opportunity; in 6 percent the respondent
agreed to correct unequal working conditions and in 8 percent to grant
back pay. Settlements also included commitments to admit com-
plainants to union membership (2 percent of the cases), to correct
other union practices (5 percent of the cases), to cease discriminatory
referral practices (7 percent of the cases), and to broaden sources of
recruitment.62
The cases adjusted by negotiation make up 97.2 percent of the cases
in which discrimination was found to exist. In only 4 cases did the
breakdown of negotiations force the commission to issue a formal
accusation. 3 These statistics strongly indicate not only that moral force
57 Ibid.
58 ibid.
59 Ibid.60 Interview, supra note 55.
61 [1961-1962] FEPC REPORTS 29.
62 Ibid. The total percentage of types of "satisfactory adjustment" is more than
100, since more than one adjustive action may result from a single case.
63 Id. at 26. FEPC cumulative statistics for the first five years of its operation
(Sept. 18, 1959- Aug. 31, 1964) are as follows (as cited in Cal. FEPC Employment
Statistics):
Employment Cases
1. Dqcketed Individual Complaints 3563
FEPC Investigations under CAL.
LABoR CoDE § 1421. 101
Total 3664
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can eliminate discrimination but also that the FEPC is a potent instru-
ment for turning such force to practical advantage. The commission
believes that these facts form the strongest argument for continuing
support of fair employment commissions in California and elsewhere.64
The first of the four cases, Andrews v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., in
which the commission issued a formal accusation resulted from a
complaint filed by Lennie Andrews, a Negro, against his employer, the
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, and the union representing
him, the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen.6 5 The union reached an
agreement with the commission but the accusation against the railroad
went to trial before the full commission after the commission found
evidence of racial discrimination and had failed to negotiate a set-
tlement of the dispute. The commission's finding against the railroad
and its order were appealed to the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County under section 1428 of the Labor Code. After trial, the court
2. Closed Individual Complaints 2872
FEPC Investigations under CAL.
LABOR CODE § 1421. 47
Total 2919
3. Pending Individual Complaints 691
FEPC Investigations under CAL.
LABOR CODE § 1421. 54
Total 745
Disposition of Employment Cases
1. Corrective Action Effected 835
2. Insufficient Evidence or No
Evidence of Discrimination 1793
3. Public Hearing Held 3
4. No Jurisdiction 90
5. Complaint Withdrawn 198
Total 2919
Employment
1. Affirmative Actions
(current) 26
2. Affirmative Actions
(cumulative total) 27
The "Affirmative Actions" category includes those investigations under CAL. LABoR
CODE § 1421 conducted by the FEPC where discrimination by an employer or union
against an entire group of people has been alleged. Conciliatory action has been taken
by the FEPC following an investigation instigated at the request of a private group
or an employer. The FEPC takes its statutory authority for this type of action under
CAL. LAB OR CODE § 1419(h). Interview With FEPC Education Officer, in San Fran-
cisco, Sept. 10, 1964. These statistics are now on file at the FEPC library.
6 4 Interview, supra note 55.
65 No. LA-1 (FEP 60-13-037) on file at FEPC Library, San Francisco.
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vacated the commission's order.68 In its memorandum the court stated
that it was forced to conclude that
the Commission's finding that petitioner's [the railroad's] refusal
to promote Andrews was based on race or color, and the finding
that his discharge was unjustified and done in retaliation for
filing a complaint with the Commission, are both contrary to
the weight of the evidence .... Giving full credit to Andrew's
testimony leads only to this conclusion: His supervisors dis-
criminated against him and he was a Negro. It does not show
discrimination because he was a Negro. The whole evidence,
including Andrews' testimony, shows many reasons for hostility
not based on race or color. Even if we accept Andrews' conten-
tion that he was badly used, this is not shown to have been
connected with any violation of the Fair Employment Practice
Act.67
The second 8 and third69 cases in which the commission issued
accusations followed the pattern set in Andrews: the superior court
overturned the commission's orders on the ground that it was against
the weight of the evidence. In neither case did the court issue a memo-
randum. The last of the four cases in which the FEPC issued an
accusation during this period was settled before it came to a hearing.70
Of the educational and informational activities undertaken by the
commission,71 the first was to provide written guidance as to what
pre-employment questions on job application forms and in help-wanted
advertising would be lawful under section 1420 (c). After a preliminary
draft was discussed at public meetings, the commission published a
Guide to Lawful and Unlawful Pre-employment Inquiries. It was also
provided a sample poster to demonstrate the manner in which fair
employment policy might best be announced in a plant or work area,
and a Fair Employment Checklist. In 1960, the commission published
the first issue of the Fair Employment Newsletter, a report of the
activities of the commission and new developments in the field of
equal opportunity. The Newsletter has become a regular bi-monthly
feature. In addition to publication of these items, the commission's
educational activities have included speaking engagements, television
66 Andrews v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., Civil No. 771033, Super. Ct., Los Angeles,
Cal., Jan. 29, 1962.
67 Ibid.
68 Ramsey v. T. H. Wilton Co., No. SF-i (FEP 60-A-239) on file at FEPC Library,
San Francisco.6 9 McNeil v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., No. SF-3 (FEP 60-A-215) on file at FEPC
Library, San Francisco.70 Interview With FEPC Education Officer, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
71 See [1960] FEPC REPoRT 35-37.
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and radio appearances, press interviews by all five commissioners and
important staff members.
Inherent Limitations in the FEPA: Exemptions
and Qualifications
The first of five express exemptions72 to the FEPA exempts from
the act employers regularly employing less than five persons.73 There
are several reasons for creating this exemption.74 A sense of justice
and propriety led the framers to believe that individuals should be
allowed to retain some small measure of the so-called freedom to
discriminate; besides, they feared the political repercussions of
eliminating totally an area of free choice whose infringement had
been so bitterly opposed. In the second place, the framers believed
that discrimination on a small scale would prove exceedingly difficult
to detect and police. Third, it was believed that an employment situa-
tion in which there were less than five employees might involve a close
personal relationship between employer and employees and that fair
employment laws should not apply where such a relationship existed.75
Finally, the framers were interested primarily in attacking protracted,
large-scale discrimination by important employers and strong unions.
Their aim was not so much to redress each discrete instance of individ-
ual discrimination as to eliminate the egregious and continued dis-
criminatory practices of economically powerful organizations. Thus
they could afford to exempt the small employer.
One question which arises under this exemption is whether it
includes an individual who owns and conducts several businesses
at each of which less than five persons are employed but at all of
which a total of five or more are employed. As early as 1948 New York's
72 In order to distinguish between the two main types of exemptions in the FEPA,
the word "exemption" will be used here to refer only to the exemptions granted the
five types of employees expressly described in section 1413(d) and (e), viz., employers
of less than five persons, employers who are social clubs, fraternal, charitable, educational,
or religious associations not organized for profit, employers of agricultural workers who
reside on the land where they are employed, employees who are domestic servants in
the home, and employees who are parents, children, or spouses of their employers. The
word "qualification" will be used to refer to the exceptions to the FEPA based on "bona
fide occupational qualifications" and on "applicable security regulations," contained in
section 1420.
7 3 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(d).
74 Interview With Counsel for the FEPC, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
75 This desire not to interfere with a close personal relationship between employer
and employee is reflected also in the provisions exempting employees who are domestic
servants in the home and employees who are parents, spouses, or children of their
employers under section 1413(e).
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State Commission Against Discrimination 8 held that such an individ-
ual's employees were all to be counted together and that therefore
the exemption did not apply.77 The position of California's FEPC is
the same.78
The California act states that an employer falls within its provi-
sions only when he is regularly employing five or more persons. 9
This does not mean that the accused employer must have five or more
employees every day throughout the year or that he must have five
or more employees at the time of the discriminatory act. It does mean
that he must have an "average" or "normal" complement of five or
more persons in his employ on a "regular" basis. Precisely how this
rule is to be applied in practice is not yet determined. The commission
hopes to evolve a clear formula by deciding actual cases. 80
Additional problems in interpreting the exemption of employers
of less than five employees have brought forth the following rulings
from the commission: in computing the number of employees engaged
by a particular employer only those working within the state are
counted.8' Officers of corporations may be counted as employees.82
Such officials may be counted only if they carry out their duties within
the state.8 3 If an employer has four conceded employees and employs
a fifth person who falls within the exemption covering parents, spouses,
and children, that fifth person is nonetheless counted as an employee,
and the employer comes within the act.84
The second of the five exemptions to the FEPA excludes from the
act "social club[s], fraternal, charitable, educational or religious
association[s] or corporation[s] not organized for private profit."85
The reason for such an exemption is obvious. The fraternity or social
club remains the sanctum sanctorum of free choice, free association,
and freedom to discriminate. Political realities demand that such or-
ganizations be left some room to discriminate.8 6 But why such volun-
tary associations should be totally exempt from fair employment laws
is not clear. No doubt they should be permitted to favor a particular
I0 Hereinafter called SCAD.
7 SCAD, REPoRT OF P OCnss 45 (1948).78 Interview, supra note 74.
'79 CAL. LABoR CoDE: § 1420(d).
80 Interview, supra note 74.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 CAL. LABoR CoDE § 1413(d).
8O Interview With Counsel for FEPC, in San Francisco, Aug. 15, 1963.
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race, religion, or nationality where such a qualification is necessary
for performance of the job involved. Such discrimination is allowed
under California's "bona fide occupational qualification" provision . 7
Perhaps they should be permitted to discriminate in favor of the race,
religion, or nationality of which their group is representative, even
where no bona fide occupational qualification exists. But in a state
which endorses a fair employment policy it seems incongruous to
allow such groups to discriminate freely in all situations.
The most difficult problem of interpretation involving the volun-
tary associations exemption concerns the status of state educational
institutions. Despite the fact that New York's anti-discrimination
statute, like California's, declares that "employer" does not include
an "educational . . . association or corporation," SCAD has contended
that state educational institutions, because of their public character,
do not come within the exemption. 8 California's FEPC has taken the
same position. 9 California has the stronger case, however, for its
statute expressly declares that "employer" includes "the State or any
political or civil subdivision thereof."90 When the University of Cali-
fornia claimed exemption under the non-profit provision, the State
Attorney General in an advisory opinion to the FEPC ruled that the
University was an arm of the State and could not therefore be exempt."'
The University did not accept the ruling but agreed to negotiate the
particular problem in question with the FEPC. An agreement between
the FEPC and the University was reached as a result of the negotia-
tions. The University did not concede the FEPC's jurisdiction, but
the commission was of the opinion that the procedure to be followed
by the University in investigating and disposing of complaints was
satisfactory. The issue may arise again should a conflict over the Uni-
versity's disposition of a complaint with the FEPC's opinion on the
complaint occur at a later time.9
The third of the exemptions in the FEPA allows farmers to dis-
criminate against agricultural workers residing on the land where
they are employed.9 3 This exemption derives from no special logic.
It is the product of pure selfishness on the part of the politically
powerful farm lobby.
87 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420.
88 Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-
discrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526, 563 (1961).89 Interview, supra note 86.
9 0 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(d).
9139 Ops. ATTY. GEN. CAL. 244 (1962).
92 Interview With FEPC Education Officer, in San Francisco, Sept. 10, 1963.
93 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1413(d)-(e).
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The final two exemptions exclude from coverage domestic servants
employed in the home,94 and parents, spouses, and children of the
employer.95 It is interesting to note that both these exemptions may
be unnecessary in the sense that other provisions of the act may pro-
vide the ends they seek. Employers of domestic servants in the home
usually do not employ five or more persons; thus the provision exempt-
ing employers of less than five persons would exclude them from the
act. Also, the act prohibits only discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed, or national origin; it does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of family relationship. Thus the act need not include express
leave to discriminate on such a basis, since it does not prohibit it in
the first place.
The first of the qualifications to the FEPA, that which suspends
the provisions of the act where "applicable security regulations" are
involved, is unique to California.9 Its inclusion admits of easy ex-
planation.9 7 California is the site of an extraordinarily large number of
companies holding defense contracts. Such companies are required to
administer so-called "security checks" on many of their prospective
employees, and these checks necessarily include questions about race,
creed, and national origin. In order to avoid clear conflict with section
1420(c) of the FEPA, which prohibits pre-employment inquiries re-
lating to race, creed, color, or national origin, it was decided that the
act should expressly allow such inquiries where security regulations
required them.98 No important problems of interpretation have arisen
regarding this section of the act.9 9 The Department of Defense, which
is exempted from the act both by the "security regulations" provision
and by its status as an agency of the federal government, has agreed
to arrange its pre-employment security checks to conform with the
act. The Department will secure necessary information about race,
creed, and national origin through post-employment inquiries. 100
The second "qualification" in the FEPA is that which excuses other-
wise unlawful employment practices where they are based on a "bona
94 CAL. LA oR Conm § 1413(e).
95 Ibid.
96 CAL. LAB oR CoDE § 1420 provides that "it shall be an unlawful employment
practice . . . except where based on applicable security regulations established by the
United States or the State of California . ..
97 Interview, supra note 92.
98 It is important to note that the FEPA does not allow actual discrimination where
security clearance is involved but only permits the asking of pre-employment inquiries
which would otherwise be illegal.
99 Interview, supra note 92.
'Go ibid.
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fide occupational qualification." 01 The exception means simply that
an employer may discriminate on the basis of race, creed, or national
origin where a job can properly be performed only by a person of a
particular race, creed, or nationality. 0 2 The FEPC has recognized a
bona fide occupational qualification in the case of a nurses' registry
which sought to procure an orthodox Jew to attend a terminal case of
the same faith where the job required intimate acquaintance with
Jewish dietetic laws and other special rites. It has permitted also a
Japanese restaurant to require native Japanese waiters, since food was
to be served according to a complex Japanese ritual. The FEPC will
not recognize the desires of co-workers, traditional patterns of em-
ployment, or preferences of customers as legitimate qualifications.
The commission will deny most requests for exemption on the basis
of "atmosphere"--cases where employers claim a necessity to give an
establishment, usually a restaurant or nightclub, a certain atmosphere,
for example by hiring only Chinese or Negroes.10 3
In summary, it is important to note that neither "exemptions" nor
"qualifications" have been the subject of a public hearing or of litiga-
tion in California'04 and that only infrequently have they progressed
to those stages in New York.10 5 Both commissions will offer their good
offices for purposes of negotiation and conciliation when they find
that an exemption ousts them from jurisdiction over a particular con-
troversy or in a particular field. In California such persuasion has
achieved noteworthy results in the area of newspaper advertising.
Section 1420(e) of the FEPA prohibits aiding and abetting unlawful
employment practices, and, since it is an unlawful employment practice
to print or circulate any publication which is connected with prospec-
tive employment and which expresses discrimination as to race, etc.,
section 1420(e) prohibits newspapers from aiding and abetting an
unlawful employment practice by carrying discriminatory advertise-'
ments of employers who are covered by the act. Nothing in the act,
however, can prevent newspapers from carrying discriminatory ad-
vertisements of employers who are exempt from the act. But as a
result of negotiation by the FEPC, no major metropolitan newspaper
in California will carry discriminatory advertisements of any employer,
exempt from the act or not.108
10 1 CAL. LABOR CoDE § 1420.
'
02 Interview, supra note 92.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 SCAD, RFPORT OF PROGREss 82 (1959).
'
0 O Interview, supra note 92.
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Conclusion
For the community's minorities, full justice means proportional
representation. In a word, they seek quotas-guarantees of a given
number of employees in specific plants or specific jobs. As compensa-
tion for decades of discrimination they believe they are entitled not
merely to the elimination of bias against them but to the creation of
special arrangements to promote their separate interest. The aim of
FEPA is color-blindness-elimination of discrimination against minori-
ties; the ultimate aim of the civil rights movement is color-conscious-
ness-calculated discrimination in favor of minorities. This concept
of quotas-often called compensatory relief-may offend progressives.
Quotas defy the melting pot; they prolong sub-cultures and promote
differences and distinctions among people. They seem to fly in the face
of simple equality-to grant some people special advantages over
others nominally their equals. Yet while special advantage arbitrarily
conferred may indeed be unjust, special support for underprivileged
groups is deep-set in the American political tradition. The civil rights
movement invites comparison to the New Deal. There, labor and
agriculture sought and received special favors over the community at
large; today, racial minorities seek similar advantage. The plight of
the latter is as desperate as the former; its cause certainly as righteous;
its demands may be quite as justifiable.
The California FEPC hag no official position on compensatory
relief. ° Although the FEPA on the surface appears to bar discrimina-
tion against the community in favor of minorities as well as discrimina-
tion by the community against minorities, 08 nothing in the act prevents
the commission from supporting compensatory relief in theory or from
suggesting amendments to the act in order to follow it to press for such
relief. 0 9 The commission believes, however, that the movement for
compensatory relief ought to remain in the hands of the minority
groups themselves." 0
107 Interview With Assistant Chief of FEPC, in San Francisco, June 20, 1963.
1o See CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420(a).
109 Indirect support for the idea of compensatory relief has come from the supreme
court. In Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist. 59 Cal. 2d 876, 881, 382 P.2d 878,
881-82, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 609-10, the court said, "Where such [residential] segregation
exists it is not enough for a school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory
conduct .... The right to an equal opportunity for education and the harmful con-
sequences of segregation require that school boards take steps, insofar as reasonably
feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools regardless of its cause."
110 Interview, supra note 107.
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Voluntary compensatory relief by individual employers is a possi-
bility, but such employers face two major problems: first, the FEPA
itself prohibits discrimination in favor of minorities as well as dis-
crimination against them. Section 1420(a) makes it an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer, "because of race, religious creed,
color, national origin, or ancestry of any person, to refuse to hire or
employ him... ." Refusing to employ a Caucasian in order to employ
a Negro is as much a violation of the letter of this section as refusing
to hire a Negro in order to employ a Caucasian. In the second place,
employers who wish to hire minority group members cannot place
requests for such workers with the California Department of Employ-
ment. That department is barred by administrative order from process-
ing such "discriminatory" requests."- However, the problems are
largely procedural and an employer can use several methods to bring
workers into his employ without running afoul of the above restric-
tions.
Enforced compensatory relief presents difficult problems of policy.
One question, for example, is how to determine what quota a minority
group ought to receive in a specific job or at a specific plant. A
second difficulty is how to decide which minority groups are entitled
to quotas. Finally, if an employer is forced to employ a quota of
minority group workers, where can he be assured of procuring the
requisite number of trained and capable workers of the particular
minority? Should he be forced to train them himself? The problems
of compensatory relief admit of no easy solution. Yet to overcome the
barriers of de facto discrimination effected by the seniority and ap-
prenticeship systems and, beyond that, to break through the vicious
circle of residential, educational, and cultural discrimination, com-
pensatory relief may be the only answer.
If the FEPC is to continue to evolve and to break new ground,
as opposed to a concentration on solidifying the gains already made,
the natural step forward is an investigation of compensatory relief.
The practical problems of implementing a system of quotas must be
researched and a concrete program suggested. Experiments with the
actual operation of such a system must be made. The FEPC has the
experience, facilities, powers, and public support for this function.
No organization is better equipped to instruct and inform the body
politic on the issue of quotas. At the least, the commission should
not hesitate to bring a complaint of its own under section 1421 when-
"' ibid.
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ever the situation warrants. FEPC stands well within the mainstream
of the civil rights movement and enjoys strong popular support. As
long as the accusations filed by the commission are reasonable, as long
as they avoid any taint of arbitrariness or revenge, they are more likely
to arouse support than hostility.

